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DOES EMOTION-REGULATION MODERATE OSTRACISM AND RISK-TAKING?  
by  
SERENA K. MURPHY 
 (Under the Direction of Ty Boyer) 
ABSTRACT 
Ostracism, feeling excluded or ignored, has been associated with increased risk-taking behavior 
on a number of self-report and lab-based measures (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Duclos, Wan, & 
Jiang, 2012; Falk et al., 2014; Svetieva et al. 2016). Anger mediates the relationship between 
ostracism and risk-taking (Svetieva et al., 2016), and it is possible that emotion-regulation 
strategies to reduce anger may minimize this relationship. However, research has yet to test if 
emotion-regulation strategies can reduce affective responses following ostracism. The purpose of 
the current study is to examine the effects of ostracism via Cyberball and emotion-regulation 
strategies on risk-taking behavior using the Columbia Card Task (CCT), an objective risk-taking 
measure. It was predicted that participants in the ostracism condition would uniquely vary on 
risk-taking based on social condition (included vs. ostracism), emotion-regulation instructions 
(reappraisal vs. no instructions), and CCT version (Hot vs. Cold). Sixty-five participants were 
assigned to one of eight conditions in which they were instructed to either reappraise or given no 
instructions to regulate their emotional responses, were either socially included or ostracized, and 
then completed the affective (Hot) version of the CCT or the deliberative (Cold) version of the 
CCT. Although we found that ostracized participants self-reported greater feelings of anger 
compared to socially included participants, we found no difference between social conditions or 
emotion-regulation conditions for risk-taking. However, given the limited sample size and 
 
 
several indicators suggesting the Cold CCT was not an effective measure of risk-taking in the 
current study, these results should be interpreted with caution. Research should continue to 
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Risk-taking, or any behavior that can produce negative outcomes (Boyer, 2006), can have 
serious consequences on individuals and communities. Adolescence and young adulthood are 
periods in which individuals are presented with new responsibilities and opportunities to take 
risks such as learning to drive, exploring romantic relationships, and making financial decisions. 
According to Safer America, on average over 3,000 people die per day from car accidents 
worldwide, making car accidents the primary cause of death for teens and young adults (Beltz, 
2018). 
Although there are positive forms of risk-taking (e.g., pursuing college, asking someone 
on a date, moving into your own apartment) which promote personal growth and independence, 
it is important to explore the factors that affect risk-taking behavior to minimize negative forms 
of it such as reckless driving, excessive drinking, gambling, sexual promiscuity, and illicit drug 
use. Adolescence and young adulthood are also sensitive times to peer influence and social 
exclusion, which could worsen negative risk-taking behaviors (Blakemore & Mills, 2014). 
The Need to Belong  
 Humans are innately social, and we possess a strong need to form stable, long-lasting 
relationships. These relationships are crucial for survival and facilitate physical and 
psychological functioning (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007). Baumeister and Leary 
(1995) argue that our need to belong is so fundamental to human existence, it is as important as 
meeting our basic needs including food, water, and shelter. When individuals feel excluded, 
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either physically or psychologically separated from others, a number of negative psychological 
and physiological consequences ensue (Buelow, Okdie, Brunell, & Trost, 2015).  
Negative Consequences of Ostracism 
Wesselmann and Williams (2017) argue that there are two primary categories of social 
exclusion: social rejection and ostracism. They argue while references to rejection and ostracism 
are often used interchangeably that these terms represent distinct experiences of social exclusion 
and may differentially affect psychological outcomes. Social rejection, a direct experience of 
social exclusion, is characterized by experiences of being devalued through derogatory 
comments, stigmatization, microaggressions, and similar experiences. Ostracism, an indirect 
experience of social exclusion, is characterized by feelings of being ignored and excluded while 
in the presence of someone else (e.g., no eye contact, being avoided, not being considered for a 
decision). Indeed, social rejection, a more severe experience than ostracism, results in emotional 
numbing, whereas ostracism results in hypersensitivity and emotional distress (Bernstein & 
Claypool, 2012a; Bernstein & Claypool, 2012b).  
 Williams (2009) suggests there are three stages to experiencing ostracism. In the 
Reflexive stage, people first experience negative psychological and physical consequences (e.g., 
increased pain, negative affect, violation of fundamental needs, distorted cognitive processes) in 
response to ostracism. During the Reflective stage, people attempt to utilize various cognitive 
(appraisal), coping, and behavioral strategies to recover from the pain of ostracism (Hartgerink, 
Van Beest, Wicherts, & Williams, 2015). For instance, people may attempt to understand why 
they were ostracized (Wesselmann & Williams, 2017). If ostracism occurs over a prolonged 
amount of time, people enter stage three, the Resignation stage, in which they experience 
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feelings of isolation, depression, worthlessness, and that life is meaningless (Riva, Montali, 
Wirth, Curioni, & Williams, 2017).  
 Ostracism has been associated with increased negative affect, reduction in working 
memory, poorer executive functioning, and a violation of fundamental needs including the need 
to belong, self-esteem, sense of control, and meaningful existence (Buelow, Okdie, Brunell, & 
Trost, 2015; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002). Few studies have examined the long-term 
effects of ostracism on fundamental needs, but Buelow et al. (2015) found that the threats to 
fundamental needs continued into the second stage of ostracism, the Reflective stage.  
Additionally, while some research suggests that social exclusion via social rejection (e.g., future 
alone, not being chosen by a group) may lead to emotional numbness (Twenge, Catanese, & 
Baumeister, 2003), ostracism has been linked with heightened negative arousal and an increase 
in anger and sadness (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Svetieva et al., 2016).  
 The pain and psychological outcomes of ostracism can be found in a relatively subtle and 
common manipulation of ostracism, a task referred to as Cyberball. During Cyberball, a 
participant believes he or she is playing a virtual ball-tossing game with several other players. 
The participant chooses whom to throw the ball by clicking an avatar representing the other 
player. Unbeknownst to them, the task is pre-programmed to either exclude or include the 
participant. In the ostracism condition, the participant only receives the ball in the first few 
rounds, whereas participants in the inclusion condition receive the ball one-third of the time 
(Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000). A similar task called Atimia has been used to manipulate 
ostracism (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Wirth, Turchan, Zimmerman, & Bernstein, 2014). For 
Atimia, participants are informed they are completing a virtual online typing game with two 
other players that are computer-programmed. Specifically, the player types a letter or 
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punctuation mark and then chooses which player will play next. Like Cyberball, participants in 
the ostracism condition are selected only a few times by the other players at the beginning, and 
included participants are selected one-third of the time. 
When individuals feel that they have been rejected for someone else (a comparative 
rejection), they report greater negative affect compared to a non-comparative rejection that is 
experienced or imagined, and if the situation is ambiguous, individuals often assume that they 
were rejected for someone else (Deri & Zitek, 2017). The fundamental need to belong, 
threatened more by a comparative rejection, mediated the relationship between rejection type and 
negative affect (Deri & Zitek, 2017). Given that participants are informed that they are playing 
with two or three other players for Cyberball, the task may induce social pain and negative affect 
because the participant believes he or she is being excluded for another player, experiencing a 
comparative rejection.  
 Negative psychological consequences occur not only when participants believe they are 
playing against other people, but also when participants are informed that they are playing 
against a computer. The threat to four fundamental psychological needs (i.e., belonging, self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence) are also self-reported when participants are told that 
they are playing against a computer, which is pre-programmed to only pass them the ball a 
certain proportion of times (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004). Van Beest and Williams 
(2006) found that even when it was monetarily advantageous to be ostracized and 
disadvantageous to be included, the experience of ostracism in Cyberball was perceived as 
painful. Furthermore, ostracism is experienced as painful regardless of individual differences in 
personality (McDonald & Donnellan, 2012). However, personality may affect coping responses 
to ostracism as Ren, Wesselmann and William (2016) found individuals who are higher on 
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introversion are more likely to socially isolate themselves after being ostracized than individuals 
lower on introversion (i.e., higher on extraversion). Thus, our reactions to ostracism, at least in 
part, appear to be driven by automatic processes, which could be explained by our evolutionary 
dependence on others to survive and reproduce. 
It is necessary for psychological well-being that people form stable, long-lasting 
relationships (Baumeister, Brewer, Tice, & Twenge, 2007). This need to belong and connect 
with others is so strong that when social inclusion and belongingness are temporarily threatened, 
even when people are told the experience of ostracism is due to a mechanized response, it can be 
incredibly painful and result in negative psychological and physiological consequences, which 
can have powerful effects on decision-making. 
Ostracism and Risk-taking 
 Given the many ill effects of ostracism, it is not surprising that ostracism influences 
decision-making processes and has been associated with increased risk-taking. Ostracism has 
been linked with increased risk-taking on various lab-based tasks such as probability tasks, 
gambling and other financial risk-taking tasks, and driving simulations and has been found when 
participants are tested individually and in group settings (Buelow & Wirth, 2017; Duclos, Wan, 
& Jiang, 2012; Falk et al., 2014)  
Several mechanisms could explain the link between ostracism and risk-taking. First, 
emotions may affect decision-making, and emotional responses ensuing after an experience of 
ostracism could affect information processing and alter risk-taking behavior. Additionally, 
people may be highly motivated to become reintegrated with the group or achieve a renewed 
sense of belonging following ostracism, so individuals may be especially motivated to take risks 
in the presence of others. However, risk-taking behavior is dependent on many factors such as 
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the type of risk (e.g., health, financial, sexual), whether the task evokes affective decision 
making or deliberate processing, age, sensitivity to peer influence, gender, available cognitive 
resources, and other contextual factors.  
One of the most ubiquitous opportunities to take risks lies in the realm of financial 
decision-making. The relationship between ostracism and greater risk-taking has been supported 
in this domain, though the reason for this relationship is unclear. Duclos, Wan, and Jiang (2012) 
consistently found that socially excluded individuals preferred the financially riskier options than 
socially included individuals (e.g., lotteries, retirement, investments) across five studies and 
multiple manipulations of ostracism. The effect of ostracism on risk-taking was found when 
tested immediately in the lab and retroactively, based on self-reported financial decisions, 
providing support that this relationship exists throughout all of William’s proposed stages of 
ostracism. This relationship between ostracism and financial risk-taking could be explained by 
changes in affect from ostracism that alter decision making, reliance on spending as a coping 
strategy for ostracism, or individuals seeking greater financial gain to reassert status in the social 
group.  
Then, to what extent, does ostracism affect decision-making, and does this relationship 
extend to other risk-taking domains? Kahneman (2011) argues there are the following two types 
of processes in decision-making: Type 1 processes which are automatic, guided by emotions, and 
often disadvantageous and Type II processes which are controlled, guided by reason, and often 
yield advantageous results. Importantly, tasks developed to assess risk-taking in the lab often 
differ in their reliance on Type I and Type II processes.  
Buelow and Wirth (2017) examined how ostracism could affect performance on risk-
taking tasks differing in Type I and Type II decision-making processes. In Study 1, the 
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researchers explored the effect of ostracism via Cyberball on Type 1 processes using the Balloon 
Analog Risk Task (BART). In the BART, participants play a computerized game in which they 
decide how many times to press a key to inflate a virtual balloon. The bigger the balloon gets, the 
more points the participant receives, but if the balloon pops, the participant does not receive any 
points. This task relies on Type 1 processes because the balloon is programmed to explode 
randomly, making it impossible to calculate the probability that the balloon will explode. 
Because of the uncertainty associated with the risk, participants must rely on affective responses 
or “gut feelings” when engaging in this risk task. There was no effect of ostracism on the BART, 
an affective risk-taking measure under uncertainty. Ostracized participants compared to included 
participants reported lower scores on the fundamental needs scale and greater feelings of 
burdensomeness; however, there were no difference in negative affect. The lack of an affective 
response could explain why there was no effect of ostracism on this risk-taking task. 
Alternatively, participants may have had discrete affective reactions (e.g., anger) that were not 
captured by the general negative affect index used. In the second study, Buelow and Wirth 
(2017) utilized a similar ostracism task called Atimia to manipulate ostracism. After completing 
the Atimia task, the participants completed the BART (Type 1) and the Game of Dice Task 
(GDT, Type II). In contrast with the BART, participants choose between riskier and safer bets 
for the GDT. This task is thought to rely on Type II decision-making processes, in which 
decisions are deliberate and calculated, because participants can predict different combinations 
of die being rolled and each bet is independent of the previous choice. Buelow and Wirth (2017) 
found that ostracism, manipulated with the Atimia task affected performance on the Game of 
Dice Task (Type II). For Atimia, ostracized participants, compared to included participants, also 
self-reported higher negative affect, feelings of burdensomeness, and lower satisfaction on the 
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fundamental needs scale. Together, these findings indicate that ostracism may have a stronger 
effect on Type II processes than Type I processes. The possible difference of ostracism on Type 
1 and Type II processes may be because Type II processes recruit more or different cognitive 
resources than Type I processes.  
 Much of decision-making in everyday life involves a combination of Type I and Type II 
processes, so the generalizability of some lab risk-taking tasks may be limited. Risk-taking 
manipulations that may be more typical or reflective of daily risk-taking behavior include 
simulated driving tasks. The effects of ostracism on risk-taking during driving simulations have 
been found for both adolescents and adults. Falk et al. (2014) examined the neurological 
underpinnings of ostracism on risky driving. Participants played Cyberball while in an fMRI 
scanner and returned a week later to complete a simulated driving task in the presence of a 
confederate that either endorsed or did not endorse risk. The driving task was rigged so that the 
stoplights would turn yellow, and risk-taking was measured as the proportion of the time spent at 
the intersection when the light was red during the game. Greater activity in brain regions 
associated with mentalizing (e.g., Anterior Insula + subACC) and social-affective (e.g., DMPFC 
+ rTPJ + PCC) processes during Cyberball predicted risky driving during the presence of a peer, 
beyond baseline driving measures and confederate risk-attitude. This indicates that peer presence 
affects risk-taking behavior and that emotional reactions to ostracism may drive this relationship. 
In contrast to Buelow and Wirth (2017), the findings on risky driving show that ostracism may 
impact automatic, gut-level Type I processes as well and applies to situations in which the 
amount of risk involved is uncertain or cannot be calculated.  
Moreover, emotional reactions to ostracism can influence risk-taking behaviors in other 
ways. Negative emotions ensue after ostracism, which can produce hypersensitivity, especially if 
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the individual is sensitive to peer influence, and result in even greater negative affect. In a similar 
neuroimaging study utilizing Cyberball and the Stoplight task, Peake et al. (2013) found that 
participants who performed poorly driving in the presence of peers after being ostracized showed 
increased activation in the ACC and IPFC, areas related to emotional distress and emotion-
regulation. Thus, negative emotions from ostracism may be further exacerbated by an increased 
concern regarding others’ judgments when performance suffers. Adolescents may be particularly 
sensitive to how they perform in the presence of others after being ostracized and these 
emotional reactions may affect driving behaviors, having dire consequences.  
Furthermore, the effects of ostracism on risky driving continue into adulthood. Svetieva 
and colleagues (2016) sought to identify specific mediating factors between ostracism and risk-
taking behavior in young adults. They predicted that anger (an approach-oriented emotion), but 
not sadness or need for control, would mediate the relationship between ostracism and risk-
taking. In Study 1, participants played Cyberball and then completed self-report measures on 
anger and the Evaluation of Risks Questionnaire (EVAR). They found that anger, but not need 
for control, mediated ostracism and self-reported risk-taking propensity. In Study 2, participants 
completed the Cyberball task and then played a driving simulation video game. It was found that 
anger, not sadness, mediated the relationship between ostracism and increased risk-taking during 
this driving simulation. Importantly, this is the first study to differentiate between the effects of 
anger and sadness on risk-taking, whereas other studies have either not measured anger or only 
analyzed generalized negative affect rather than discrete emotions. Thus, it may be that anger 
resulting from ostracism, rather than general negative affect, impacts risk-taking behaviors.  
Emotions and Risk-taking         
 Several theoretical frameworks exist regarding how emotions impact decision-making 
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such as the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF, Learner and Keltner, 2000), the Affect 
Infusion Model (AIM, Forgas, 1995), and the Broaden-and-Build theory (Fredrickson, 2004). 
These theories postulate that affective states differentially influence cognitive processes. Because 
the Broaden-and-Build theory focuses solely on the effects of positive emotions, it is less 
pertinent to the affective consequences of ostracism on decision-making. The Affect Infusion 
Model (AIM) has been used to investigate risk-taking behavior; however, it focuses on the 
general effects of mood for decision-making, and such research has been mixed (Angie, 
Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011). Thus, researchers began to isolate the different effects of 
discrete emotions on risk-taking. Negative emotions such as anger, anxiety, fear, sadness, and 
disgust have been associated with different risk-taking behaviors. 
The Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) is a particularly strong theoretical framework 
because it accounts for how different negative emotions can impact decision-making. According 
to this framework, emotions have specific cognitive characteristics associated with them that 
guide behaviors, or action tendencies. For ATF, discrete emotions are associated with different 
risk-taking outcomes as a function of the appraisal that accompanies it. According to the ATF, 
negative emotions (e.g., anger and sadness) can have different outcomes on decision-making, 
whereas emotions differing in valence (e.g., anger and happiness) can have similar outcomes. 
Specific emotions are associated with different feelings of control and certainty for future events. 
For instance, anger is associated with appraisals of high certainty and control, whereas fear is 
associated with appraisals of low certainty and control (Learner & Keltner, 2000). Thus, when 
someone experiences anger, he or she is likely to perceive future events as predictable and 
controllable, creating a low perception of risk. In contrast, someone who experiences fear is 
likely to perceive future events as unpredictable and uncontrollable, perceiving risk as high. 
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Anger and happiness, both associated with high appraisals of certainty produce heuristic 
processing, in which participants rely on emotional cues from previous decisions. Sadness and 
fear, associated with feelings of unpredictability and lack of control, indicating the possibility of 
a risky situation, yield more systematic processing to ensure that all risks are evaluated.  
In line with the ATF, a meta-analysis revealed that anger is associated with increased 
risk-taking (Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011).  However, the effects of anger on risk-
taking are context-dependent, dependent on the type of task. Lab-based behavioral measures of 
risk-taking differ in terms of task uncertainty and deliberative risk-taking and affective and non-
affective components. For instance, the BART involves uncertainty as participants do not know 
at what point the balloon will pop. Importantly, this uncertainty is inherent in the task and is 
distinct from appraisals of certainty associated with specific emotions. Examples of deliberative 
risk-taking involve tasks with calculable risk probabilities such as the Game of Dice Task, 
common lottery tasks, and the Columbia Card Task (Schiebener & Brand, 2015). The Columbia 
Card Task is a particularly strong behavioral risk-taking measure as it provides greater insight 
into what information is used for decision-making including gain, loss, and probability (Figner, 
Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). 
In the Columbia Card Task (CCT), participants see a virtual array of cards, lying face 
down, and are instructed that the cards include gain cards, for which they can earn points, and 
loss cards, which end the trial. Participants can select the number of cards to flip over to win 
points based on the number of loss cards (probability), points earned for each card (gain) and 
points lost for a bad card (loss). Risk-taking is measured based on the number of cards chosen to 
flip over (i.e., the more cards a participant flips, the riskier the participant is scored). Moreover, 
the Columbia Card Task has been developed to assess risk-taking in tasks that involve affective 
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(hot, heuristic processing) and non-affective (cold, systematic) processing (Figner et al., 2009). 
In the Hot CCT, participants are able to flip over individual cards, receiving feedback if each 
card is a loss or gain card. In the Cold CCT, participants select the number of cards for each trial 
but are not provided feedback regarding the outcome of the decision (i.e., they do not receive a 
score at the end of the trial). Generally, people tend to be riskier on the Hot CCT than on the 
Cold CCT (Figner et al., 2009).  
Baumann and DeSteno (2012) sought to further illuminate the paradoxical effects of 
anger on deliberative risk-taking using the CCT. Although anger is associated with increased 
risk-taking, it is also associated with increased estimates that negative events will occur 
(perceiving risk as high). Based on the Conceptual Act Model, they proposed that anger would 
decrease risk-taking on the Hot CCT, as participants rely more on the affective components of 
anger in which anger is used as an “informational cue” that risk is high, and would decrease risk-
taking on the Cold CCT as participants rely more on the conceptual components of anger 
(appraising control and certainty as high). Supporting this prediction, Baumann and DeSteno 
(2012) found that participants who had written about an experience that had made them feel 
angry for four minutes were riskier on the Cold CCT than participants that wrote about a typical 
day. In contrast, angry participants were less risky on the Hot CCT than their neutral 
counterparts. Angry participants were still riskier on the Hot CCT than the Cold CCT, replicating 
the findings of Figner et al. (2009), such that riskiness was in the following order based on 
condition and task: neutral – Hot CCT (riskiest) > Angry – Hot CCT > Angry – Cold CCT > and 
Neutral – Cold CCT (least risky). Thus, it appears that anger may have opposing effects on 
deliberative risk-taking, depending on the context of the risk-taking task. However, this diverges 
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slightly from the Appraisal Tendency Framework, has only been tested once, and the researchers 
used only four trials of the CCT rather than the 24 round version now commonly used.  
As we have discussed, ostracism increases negative affect, specifically anger and sadness. 
It was found that anger, not sadness, mediated the relationship between ostracism and greater 
risk-taking on a driving simulation. Specific emotions, not affective valence, have distinct effects 
on information processing and risk-taking behavior as supported by the Appraisal Tendency 
Framework. Anger is often associated with increased risk-taking, but these effects are dependent 
on the type of risk-taking being assessed. Moreover, considering the stages of ostracism, it is 
likely that people employ emotion-regulation strategies to reduce negative feelings, particularly 
during the second stage of ostracism, the Reflective stage, which could affect risk-taking 
behavior. Indeed, emotion-regulation success for anger may moderate the relationship between 
ostracism and risk-taking behaviors.  
Emotion-Regulation Strategies  
 Emotion-regulation is broadly defined as our ability to control and maintain which 
emotions we experience and when and how we experience those (Gross, 2002). Emotion-
regulation can be automatic or intentional. There are a number of emotion-regulation strategies 
that vary in temporal relation to the emotion experienced. According to the process model of 
emotion-regulation, emotion strategies are antecedent-focused, occurring before the emotion is 
fully experienced physiologically and psychologically, or response-focused, occurring after the 
emotion-response tendency (Gross, 2002). To regulate emotional responses, people can 
selectively choose situations such as seeking known positive environments and avoiding 
potentially anxiety inducing situations (e.g., avoiding an event in which someone disliked will be 
attending). Alternatively, people can modify existing situations (e.g., have a friend join an 
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uncomfortable social situation to lessen the tension), change attentional focus (e.g., look away 
from a sad movie scene), cognitively reevaluate the situation (e.g., reassess an event as more 
positive or negative), or attempt to change emotional responses (e.g., meditate to relieve 
anxiety).  
 One emotion-regulation strategy that has been explored in-depth is cognitive reappraisal. 
Reappraisal is reevaluating the meaning of something that is potentially emotion inducing in a 
way that does not elicit an emotional response. Reappraisal is considered an antecedent-focused 
emotion-regulation strategy, meaning that it occurs before an affective response is fully formed. 
Reappraisal effectively down-regulates (reduces) negative affect and increases positive affect 
(Gross, 2002; Richards and Gross, 2000). People also differ in habitual uses of reappraisal, and 
reappraisal is associated with strong psychological well-being (Gross & John, 2003). Therefore, 
cognitive reappraisal should be a particularly strong emotion-regulation strategy to utilize 
following ostracism. But to what extent do people utilize emotion-regulation strategies in 
response to ostracism? 
Ostracism and Emotion-Regulation 
Emotion-regulation can be automatic, beyond awareness, or deliberative. DeWall et al. 
(2011) examined automatic emotion-regulation responses in response to ostracism. Some 
individuals may automatically utilize emotion-regulation strategies in an attempt to reduce the 
aversive effects of ostracism on mood. They found that, although participants were unaware of 
the cognitive change, they displayed an increase in positive affect following ostracism, based on 
the number of positive emotions recalled from childhood and completion of ambiguous word 
stems. This automatic shift to positive information was found across nine studies but was only 
found for participants low in depressive symptoms and high self-esteem. Therefore, individuals 
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that could benefit the most from such an automatic emotion-regulation process likely do not 
utilize it.  
Emotion-regulation strategies are also consciously employed following ostracism. 
Goodman and Southam-Gerow (2010) found that even relatively young children (7-12 years old) 
utilize a variety of coping and emotion-regulation strategies in response to social rejection 
(teasing) and ostracism. Gender may influence the effect of ostracism on cognitive processes as 
ostracism decreases working memory for girls but not boys (Hawes et al., 2012). Hawes and 
colleagues suggest that this difference in working memory may occur because girls rely on 
different emotion-regulation strategies than boys after being ostracized. Additionally, several 
neurological studies on ostracism suggest that adolescents differ in their ability to effectively 
regulate negative emotional responses (Masten et al. 2009; Peake et al., 2013). Young adults 
were less able to effectively regulate emotional responses to social stimuli compared to non-
social stimuli, especially if they were more sensitive to rejection (Silvers et al., 2012). Thus, 
emotion-regulation strategies are used following ostracism, but doing so effectively may be 
difficult and may differ based on gender, age, and rejection sensitivity.  
Emotion-Regulation and Risk-taking  
Based on the interactive influence model of emotion and cognition (IIEC), Luo and Yu 
(2015) suggest that emotion-regulation strategies influence cognitive processes when emotional 
responses are particularly strong or when cognitive resources are weakened. Therefore, emotion-
regulation is likely to play a role in ostracism and risk-taking because ostracism elicits strong 
affective responses, while reducing cognitive functioning including working memory and 
executive functioning (Gerber and Wheeler, 2009).  
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Exploration of habitual emotion-regulation strategies indicates that emotion-regulation 
may impact decision-making in important ways. Habitual reappraisal, usually considered an 
effective emotion-regulation strategy, has been associated with increased risk-taking and 
suppression, often a poor emotion-regulation strategy, has been associated with decreased risk-
taking on the Cold CCT (Panno, Lauriola, & Figner, 2013). Similarly, habitual suppression has 
been linked with less financial riskiness (Li, Sang, & Zhang, 2015). Although the studies are 
only correlational, this research provides some support that emotion-regulation strategies may 
affect real world decision-making.  
Several studies have investigated the role of emotion-regulation strategies and their effect 
on decision-making in the lab. Heilman et al. (2010) investigated if emotion-regulation 
instructions moderate the effect of emotion and risk-taking. The emotions fear and disgust were 
induced with film clips, and participants were instructed to either reappraise, suppress, or given 
no instructions to utilize an emotion-regulation strategy. Heilman and colleagues found that 
reappraisal but not suppression was effective for reducing negative affect (fear or disgust) from 
watching the film clip. Participants who were instructed to reappraise displayed greater risk-
taking on the BART (i.e., more pumps) than participants in the suppression or no instructions 
condition. Thus, reappraising feelings of fear and disgust (associated with appraisals of low 
control) effectively down-regulated these negative emotions and reduced the associated risk-
aversion.  
Guided by the Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF), Szasz, Hofmann, Heilman, and 
Curtiss (2016) further examined the effects of emotion-regulation strategies on risk-taking using 
the BART. Specifically, they induced feelings of sadness or anger (via autobiographical 
memory) and instructed participants to either reappraise, accept, ruminate, or gave them no 
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instructions. Based on the ATF, they predicted that anger (linked with appraisals of higher 
certainty and control) would be associated with increased risk-taking, whereas sadness (linked 
with appraisals of low certainty and control) would be associated with decreased risk-taking. 
Given that reappraisal reduces negative affect, they predicted that reappraising anger would 
decrease risk-taking, whereas reappraising sadness would increase risk-taking relative to the 
other emotion-regulation strategies employed on the BART. Contrary to their predictions, they 
found that reappraisal was associated with the greatest risk-taking behavior compared to the 
other emotion-regulations strategies for both anger and sadness. These findings further support 
that reappraising negative emotions increases risk-taking (Heilman et al., 2010). Reappraisal may 
be associated with cognitive processes that independently affect or interact with the effects of 
emotions on risk-taking. For instance, habitual reappraisal has also been associated with less 
sensitivity to fluctuations in probability and loss amount (Panno et al., 2013). Thus, it is unclear, 
and worthy of further exploration, if reappraising negative emotions increases risk-taking, 
regardless of the specific negative emotion, and if discrete emotions can differentially affect risk-
taking as the Appraisal Tendency Framework suggests.  
 Another explanation that reappraising anger did not decrease risk-taking in the Szasz et 
al. (2016) study is the risk-taking measure utilized. As discussed previously, risk-taking 
measures differ on uncertainty or deliberative risk-taking and on their reliance of affective 
information. The BART measures risk-taking under uncertainty; however, perhaps anger has 
distinct effects on deliberative risk-taking as measured by the Hot and Cold versions of the 
Columbia Card Task. This explanation is also supported by the findings of Bulow and Wirth 
(2017) that ostracism, associated with anger, increased risk-taking on the Game of Dice task 
(deliberative, Type II) but not on the BART (automatic, Type I process). 
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The Current Study 
 Previous research has shown that ostracism increases anger (Svetieva, 2015; Gerber & 
Wheeler, 2009), which can have diverging effects on deliberative risk-taking, depending if the 
risk-taking task is affective or non-affective (Baumann & DeSteno, 2012). Past studies that have 
examined the role of affect in ostracism and risk-taking have focused on general negative affect 
rather than specific negative emotions (Blackhart et al., 2009; Buelow & Wirth, 2017), which 
may have obscured the role of discrete negative emotions like anger between ostracism and risk-
taking. Additionally, previous research investigating emotion-regulation has predominantly 
focused on risk-taking under uncertainty, but has consistently found that reappraisal, regardless 
of negative emotion, is associated with increased risk-taking (Heilman et al. 2010; Panno et al., 
2013; Szasas et al., 2016). 
Research has yet to test if instructing individuals to use different emotion-regulation 
strategies could alter the relationship between ostracism and risk-taking. The present study aims 
to fill this gap by exploring if cognitive reapprasial can effectively down-regulate ostracism-
related anger and impact the link between ostracism and risk-taking. In the current study, 
participants were either socially included or ostracized (via Cyberball), instructed to either 
reappraise or given no instructions to regulate their emotional responses, and completed either 
the Hot or Cold CCT.  
I have four aims in this study. First, this study aims to extend previous findings on 
ostracism and risk-taking to affective and non-affective deliberative decision-making. To my 
knowledge, previous studies of ostracism and risk-taking have not utilized the Columbia Card 
Task to assess risk-taking behavior. Secondly, this study aims to replicate the effects of ostracism 
for increasing anger reported by Svetieva et al. (2016). Thirdly, this study will further illuminate 
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if ostracism-induced anger (associated with high certainty appraisals) has differential effects on 
the Hot and Cold CCT or if reappraisal will be associated with high risk-taking regardless of 
task. Lastly, this study will assess if simple emotion-regulation instructions are sufficient to 
moderate the effects of ostracism on risk-taking.  
Predictions: 
As discussed, anger has been shown to mediate the effect of ostracism and risk-taking 
(Svetieva et al., 2016) and has been associated with increased risk-taking on the Cold CCT and 
decreased risk-taking on the Hot CCT (Baumann & DeSteno, 2012). Additionally, reappraisal 
has been shown to effectively down-regulate anger. 
Hypothesis 1: Based on these findings, I predict that ostracized participants will be riskier 
than socially included participants on the Cold CCT. Participants instructed to cognitively 
reappraise ostracism, decreasing feelings of anger, will be less risky than participants given no 
instructions for ostracism.  
Hypothesis 2: Conversely, for the Hot CCT, I predict that ostracized participants will be 
less risky than socially included participants. Participants who are ostracized and instructed to 







Seventy-two participants1(48 females, 24 males; M age =19.43, SD age = 1.45), ranging 
in age from 18 to 25 years old, from Georgia Southern University were assigned to one of eight 
conditions as a function of arbitrarily assigned participant numbers. Importantly, the researchers 
who interacted with the participants were unaware of what numbers corresponded with each of 
the conditions. Thirty-six participants identified as White (50.0%), 25 as Black or African 
American (34.7 %), and 11 as Multiracial (15.3%). Of these participants, sixty-seven participants 
(93.0%) identified as Not Hispanic or Latino, 2 participants (2.7%) identified as Hispanic or 
Latino, and 3 participants (4.2%) opted to not respond. All participants were undergraduate 
students and were recruited through SONA Systems during the Spring of 2019. The study was 
advertised on SONA as in-person study on computerized choice tasks. Participants were awarded 
course credit for completing the study.  
Four criteria were determined to eliminate careless responders prior to data analysis. 
Participants were excluded if they incorrectly answered both catch questions on the PANAS (4 
participants), indicated that their data should not be used (2 participants), selected the same 
number of cards for a string of six rounds (2 participants), or were three standard deviations from 
the mean number of cards selected (no participants). One participant violated two of the above 
criteria. These exclusionary criteria eliminated 7 participants from the overall analysis. As seen 
in Table 1, excluded participants did not systematically belong to any one condition. After 
                                                          
1 This sample size was used for the purposes of completing this master’s thesis. Data collection 




excluded participants were removed, there were 65 participants remaining (46 females, 19 
males). Of these participants, there were 34 freshman, 14 sophomores, 12 juniors, and 5 seniors.  
Procedure 
Upon arrival to the laboratory, the experimenter or a research assistant greeted 
participants and obtained informed consent. All experimental tasks and questionnaires were 
completed individually, presented on a computer, and programmed using E-Prime 3.0. 
Participants were assigned by E-Prime to one of eight conditions as noted above, and the study 
lasted approximately 15-30 minutes. All research assistants were blind to participant condition. 
The full procedural outline is available in Appendix A. 
After obtaining informed consent, participants were seated at a cubical to complete the 
experiment. Participants began by putting on headphones and entering their age. Then, 
participants were simultaneously presented with instructions for the Cyberball task and to either 
emotionally regulate their responses or given no emotion-regulation instructions. As 
recommended by Williams and Jarvis (2006), participants were instructed that they were 
completing a mental visualization task and that their ball-throwing performance did not matter 
during the Cyberball game. Cyberball and emotion-regulation instructions were presented in text 
on the computer screen and heard via an audio recording. The experiment was programmed such 
that participants could not continue until the audio recording finished playing.  
Emotion-regulation Instructions. Participants were assigned to either cognitively 
reappraise their emotions or given no emotion-regulation instructions. Cognitive reappraisal 
instructions were adapted from Richards and Gross (2000) and appeared on the computer screen 
prior to completing the Cyberball task. For the cognitive reappraisal condition, participants were 
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asked to think about the game objectively. Heilman et al. (2010) successfully replicated the 
effectiveness of these emotion-regulation instructions for fear and disgust.  
Specifically, participants assigned to the cognitive reappraisal emotion-regulation 
strategy received these additional instructions adapted from Richards and Gross (2000): “In 
addition, we would like to see how well you can control the way you view things. Therefore, it is 
very important to us that you try your best to adopt a neutral attitude as you play the game. To 
do this, we would like for you to play with the detached interest of a medical professional. In 
other words, as you play the game, try to think about it objectively and analytically rather than 
as personally, or in any way, emotionally relevant to you. So, as you play the game please try to 
think about what you are seeing in such a way that you don’t feel anything at all.” 
Ostracism. After receiving the Cyberball and emotion-regulation instructions, 
participants either completed the social inclusion or ostracism condition. Ostracism was 
manipulated based on Cyberball 4.0. Cyberball is a virtual ball tossing game in which 
participants believe they are throwing a ball back and forth with two other players. For the social 
inclusion condition, participants received the ball from the pre-programmed players, represented 
by an avatar, one-third of the time and continued to select whom to throw the ball by pressing a 
corresponding number on the keyboard. For the ostracism condition, participants were only 
thrown the ball for the first two passes, but then did not receive the ball the rest of the game (for 
approximately 30 ball tosses). This task has been used extensively and has been validated by 
Williams, Cheung, and Choi (2000). Towards the end of the experiment, participants were asked, 
“Who did you think the players were in the Cyberball game?” with “Real People” and 




Anger Measure. Given that previous research suggests that anger induced from ostracism 
specifically guides risk-taking behavior (Svetieva et al., 2016; Szasz et al., 2016), participants 
were asked to rate the extent to which they enjoyed playing and felt angry during the Cyberball 
game from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much so) immediately following Cyberball, respectively. 
These questions were adapted from Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2003). The enjoyment 
question was not analyzed; however, it was included so that participants did not become 
suspicious about the purpose of the Cyberball task.  
Emotion-regulation Manipulation Check. After completing the enjoyment and anger 
measures, participants completed three reappraisal items, modified from the State Suppression 
and Reappraisal Scale (Eglogg, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwedtfeger, 2006) to assess the extent to 
which participants utilized the instructed emotion-regulation strategy. This scale consists of two 
3-item measures for suppression and reappraisal and has shown acceptable internal consistency 
in previous research (Cronbach’s α ≥ 0.73, Egloff et al., 2006). The original scale was slightly 
modified for the current study, similarly to the modifications made by Srivastav (2017), which 
also showed good internal consistency (α ≥ .75 for each subscale). Participants were asked to 
indicate to what extent that each item applied to them during Cyberball from 1 (Not at all) to 5 
(Extremely). The three items on the cognitive reappraisal scale appeared in the following order 
and included: I tried to see the task as objectively as possible, I viewed the Cyberball as just part 
of the experiment, and I thought of the task in a way that made me stay calm. In the current 
study, we had weak internal reliability for the three reappraisal items (Cronbach’s α = .53). 
When removing the second reappraisal item, internal reliability slightly increased (Cronbach’s α 
= .63). Reliability analysis were conducted for the Reappraisal scale (first and third item only) 
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for each emotion-regulation condition (No instruction condition Cronbach’s α = .714, 
Reappraisal condition Cronbach’s α = .245). 
Columbia Card Task (CCT). Upon completion of the emotion-regulation check questions, 
participants completed a behavioral measure of risk-taking known as the Columbia Card Task, a 
virtual card playing game (Figner et al., 2009). The CCT was specifically selected to examine the 
effects of ostracism on affective processes (Hot CCT) and more deliberative processes (Cold 
CCT). The Hot CCT is associated with greater electrodermal activity (EDA) than the Cold CCT 
and baseline EDA levels. Additionally, self-reported decision-strategies supported relatively 
different decision-making strategies on the Hot and Cold CCT as the Hot CCT was associated 
with relying on “gut-level” strategies and the Cold CCT was associated with relying more on 
mathematical strategies (Figner et al., 2009). 
 For the current study, the CCT was programmed in E-Prime 3.0 based on the most 
updated and shortened 24 game round version (described in Figner & Weber, 2011; Somerville 
et al., 2018) rather than the older 54 game round version (Figner et al., 2009). For each trial or 
round, 32 virtual cards were shown face down. At the top of the screen, participants saw 
information regarding the number of loss cards (1 or 3), the gain amount (10 or 30), and the loss 
amount (-250 or -750), which were factorially crossed, yielding eight different combinations, 
which appeared in three randomized blocks. Risk-taking was determined by the number of cards 
chosen (i.e., the more cards a participant chose, the riskier the participant was scored). Reliability 
analyses were conducted on each version of the CCT (Cold CCT Cronbach’s α = .815, Hot CCT 
Cronbach’s α = .663) 
Participants were assigned to complete the cold or hot version of the Columbia Card Task 
as a function of their arbitrarily assigned number. In the cold version of the Columbia Card Task, 
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participants selected a number from 0 to 32 displayed above the array of cards for each of the 24 
rounds. After each trial, participants saw a screen that displayed the number of cards they chose, 
but no feedback was provided about potential points earned. In the hot version of the CCT, 
designed to evoke affective responses, participants individually selected which card to flip over 
and immediately received feedback if it was a win or loss card.  Each of the 24 rounds began 
with a score of zero. Unlike the cold version, participants saw a score for each round.  If a win 
card was chosen, the round total was updated accordingly at the top of the screen. Participants 
could continue to flip over cards until they decided to stop and proceed to the next round or until 
a loss card was chosen. If a loss card was flipped over, the round was terminated, and the loss 
amount was subtracted from the round total. A cumulative score was never shown to 
participants. Instructions used for the CCT can be found in Appendix B (Hot CCT instructions) 
and Appendix C (Cold CCT instructions). 
Self-Reported Affect Measure.  After completing either the cold or hot version of the 
CCT, participants completed the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) to assess the effect of Cyberball and emotion-regulation 
instructions on state negative affect. The PANAS includes two 10-item subscales widely utilized 
to assess general positive and negative affect and has been validated, showing strong internal 
consistency (Crawford & Henry, 2004) and strong convergent validity (Watson et al., 1988). In 
the current study, we had strong internal reliability (Cronbach’s α= .87) for general negative 
affect.  
Participants rated the extent they felt each emotion on a scale from 1 (Very slightly or not 
at all) to 5 (Extremely). A General Negative Affect subscale was determined by summing scores 
to the following negative emotions: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, 
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nervous, jittery, and afraid. To identify careless responders, two catch items were placed within 
the PANAS measure, indicating that participants should “Press 2” or “Press 5” for that item.  
Ostracism Manipulation Check. Next, participants were asked to rate the extent that they 
felt ignored and the extent that they felt excluded, respectively. Participants were also asked to 
estimate the percentage of throws they received during the Cyberball task assuming that included 
participants received the ball about 33% of the time. Participants also reported if they believed 
the other Cyberball players were real or computer-programmed and if their data should be used. 
Demographic information. Lastly, participants completed information regarding their 
sex, ethnicity, racial identity, and class standing. Age was recorded at the beginning of the 
experiment, but all other demographic questions were completed at the end of the study.  
After completing the study, participants were debriefed regarding the purposes of the 
study. Participants were also informally asked during the debriefing process the following 
questions: what did you think about the experiment, did you use any particular strategies for any 
of the tasks, and what do you think the study is about? No participant fully suspected the key 
variables being tested in the study. During the debriefing, participants also had the opportunity to 
be led through a short breathing exercise to mitigate any negative affect that participants may 






















114 M No Control Hot CCT 
120 F No Reappraisal Cold CCT 
126 M Yes Reappraisal Cold 
132 F Yes Control Hot 
142 M Yes Reappraisal Cold 
151 M Yes Control Cold 
170 M No Control Hot 
Totals 2 F, 4 M 
3 Included, 4 
Excluded 
4 Control, 3 
Reappraisal 
3 Hot, 4 Cold 





















 Ostracism Manipulation Check. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was used to 
determine if participants in the ostracism condition felt significantly more excluded and ignored 
than those in the social inclusion condition. Self-reported feelings of being excluded and ignored 
were combined. As expected, participants in the ostracism condition (M = 3.71, SD = 1.14) self-
reported greater feelings of ostracism than participants in the social inclusion condition (M = 
1.97, SD = 1.02), t(63) = -6.49, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.61.  
A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was also used to determine if participants in the 
social inclusion condition estimated receiving the ball a higher percentage of times than 
participants in the ostracism condition. As expected, participants who were socially included (M 
= 27.32%, SD = 11.55%) estimated receiving a greater percentage of throws than ostracized 
participants (M = 9.16%, SD = 4.95%), t(63) = 8.10, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 2.04. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the manipulation of ostracism was effective.  
Emotion-regulation Manipulation Check. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test was 
used to determine if participants utilized the cognitive reappraisal instructions. Given the low 
Cronbach’s alpha found for the reappraisal measure, the second reappraisal question was 
removed, and the first and third reappraisal measures were summed to create a reappraisal 
composite score, with an overall scale range of 2 to 10. A two-tailed, independent samples t-test 
revealed, as expected, participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition (M = 7.47, SD = 1.27) 
self-reported higher scores for reappraisal than participants in the no instruction condition (M = 
6.55, SD = 1.86), t(63) = -2.33, p = .023, Cohen’s d = 0.58. 
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Anger Manipulation Check. A 2 (social condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (emotion-
regulation instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) fully between-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to analyze mean differences for self-reported anger, measured on a scale from 1(Not 
at all) to 9 (Very Much So). A significant interaction was predicted such that those in the 
ostracism-no instructions condition would self-report significantly higher anger ratings than 
those in the ostracism-reappraisal condition and social inclusion conditions. Table 2 provides 
marginal means and standard deviations for anger based on social condition and emotion-
regulation instructions.  
There was a significant main effect for social condition F(1, 61) = 7.55, p = .008, ηp 2 = 
.110 such that participants in the ostracism condition self-reported greater feelings of anger (M = 
4.13, SD = 2.53) than those in the social inclusion condition (M = 2.47, SD = 2.26). Self-reported 
anger did not differ between those given instructions to cognitively reappraise (M = 3.25, SD = 
2.63) compared to those given no emotion-regulation instructions (M = 3.27, SD = 2.44), F(1, 
61) < .001, p = .995, ηp 2 = .000. Finally, I expected a two-way interaction such that cognitive 
reappraisal instructions would reduce self-reported anger for participants in the ostracism 
condition. Contrary to this prediction, and as illustrated by Figure 1, self-reported anger did not 
differ across instruction conditions within social conditions, F(1, 61) < .001, p = .995, ηp2 < .001. 
General Negative Affect. A 2 (Social condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (Emotion-
regulation Instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) between-subjects ANOVA was conducted 
to analyze mean differences on the general negative affect subscale, which ranged from 10 to 50. 
The purpose of this analysis was to further evaluate the claims of Svetieva et al. (2016) that it is 
specifically anger, not general negative affect, which changes following ostracism. Because 
several studies have failed to find a change in self-reported general negative affect following 
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ostracism (Buelow & Wirth, 2017), it was predicted that there would be no interaction between 
social condition and emotion-regulation instructions for general negative affect. There was no 
difference between self-reported negative affect on the PANAS between the ostracism condition 
(M = 18.48, SD = 6.61) and the social inclusion condition (M = 19.32, SD = 8.55), F(1, 61) = .21, 
p = .65, ηp 2 = .003. There was no difference for self-reported negative affect for participants in 
the reappraisal condition (M = 17.94, SD = 7.78) and those given no emotion-regulation 
instructions (M = 19.88, SD = 7.50), F(1, 61) = 1.06, p = .31, ηp 2 = .017. Supporting the 
prediction, participants did not uniquely vary in general negative affect based on social condition 
and emotion-regulation instructions, F(1, 61) = .07, p = .79, ηp 2 = .001.  
Primary Analyses 
Ostracism, Emotion-regulation, and Risk-Taking. A 2 (Social Condition: inclusion vs. 
ostracism) x 2 (Emotion-regulation Instructions: reappraisal vs. no instructions) x 2 (CCT 
version: Hot vs. Cold) between-subjects full factorial ANOVA was conducted on risk-taking. In 
a neutral affective state, participants are riskier, selecting more cards on average, on the Hot CCT 
than on the Cold CCT (Figner et al., 2009). Thus, I expected unique changes in the number of 
cards selected based on social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version such 
that ostracized participants would be riskier than socially included participants on the Cold CCT. 
Additionally, I predicted that participants instructed to cognitively reappraise ostracism would be 
less risky than participants given no instructions for ostracism on the Cold CCT. Conversely, for 
the Hot CCT, I predicted that ostracized participants would be less risky than socially included 
participants. I predicted that participants who were ostracized and instructed to reappraise would 
be riskier than participants given no instructions for ostracism. Results did not support the 
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proposed predictions. Table 3 provides marginal means and standard deviations for risk-taking 
for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version.  
Contrary to previous findings, there was a significant main effect for CCT version F(1, 
57) = 21.36, p < .001, ηp 2 = .273 such that participants were riskier on the Cold CCT (M = 13.62, 
SD = 3.93), selecting a greater number of cards on average, than participants on the Hot CCT (M 
= 9.79, SD = 2.22). This indicates that participants diverged in risk-taking behavior based on 
CCT version as previously reported by Figner et al. (2009). Risk-taking behavior did not 
significantly differ for participants in the social inclusion condition (M = 12.10, SD = 3.28) and 
those in the ostracism condition (M = 11.20, SD = 4.11) F(1, 57) = 1.19, p = .280, ηp 2 = .020. 
This indicates that ostracism did not affect risk-taking behavior collapsing across versions of the 
CCT. Risk-taking behavior did not significantly differ for participants in the cognitive 
reappraisal condition (M = 11.20, SD = 3.66) and those who received no instructions (M = 12.13, 
SD = 3.73), F(1, 57) = .93, p = .340, ηp 2 = .016. This indicates that cognitive reappraisal 
instructions did not change risk-taking behavior. Lastly, I expected that cognitive reappraisal 
would reduce the effects of ostracism for each version of the CCT. Contrary to this prediction, 
the three-way social condition x instruction condition x CCT version interaction was not 
statistically significant, F(1, 57) = 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .006, with limited variability between 
emotion-regulation instruction conditions as a function of social condition and CCT condition, as 
illustrated by Figure 2.  
Ostracism, Emotion-regulation, and Risk-Taking Excluding Loss Trials. A 2 (social 
condition: inclusion vs. ostracism) x 2 (emotion-regulation instructions: reappraisal vs. no 
instructions) x 2 (CCT version: Hot vs. Cold) between-subjects full factorial ANOVA was 
conducted on risk-taking excluding trials in which a loss card was chosen, which only affected 
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data for the Hot CCT. This analysis was conducted as another indication of risk-taking behavior 
because participants may have unlucky trials in which they quickly hit a loss card, given the 
random location of loss cards across trials, which may obscure participants’ true risk-taking 
behaviors. For instance, if a participant hit a loss card after selecting two cards, it would appear 
that participant was not very risky on that round for the previous analysis, selecting only 2 of 32 
cards; however, had the participant been able to continue on that round, he or she may have 
selected many more cards.  
Fifty-nine participants were included for this analysis as six participants selected a loss 
card on all 24 CCT rounds, and thus could not be included. I predicted a three-way interaction 
for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version for risk-taking. Results 
did not support the proposed predictions. Table 4 provides marginal means and standard 
deviations for risk-taking for social condition, emotion-regulation instructions, and CCT version 
excluding loss trials. However, this data should be interpreted with caution because eliminating 
trials in which participants chose a loss card (i.e., kept turning over cards until a loss card was 
chosen) produced missing data for many of cells of the eight possible win amount, loss amount, 
and number of loss card combinations. In fact, participants opted to hit “Stop and Move On” for 
only 25% of the trials. Thus, eliminating trials in which a loss card was selected removed 75% of 
the trials for the Hot CCT.  
The analysis revealed no difference for number of cards selected between the Cold CCT 
(M =13.62, SD = 3.93) and Hot CCT (M = 12.32, SD = 6.36) when excluding trials in which a 
loss card was chosen, F(1, 57) = .59, p = .45, ηp 2 = .011. This indicates that CCT version did not 
affect risk-taking behavior when excluding loss trials. Risk-taking behavior did not significantly 
differ for participants in the social inclusion condition (M = 13.12, SD = 4.56) and those in the 
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ostracism condition (M = 12.92, SD = 5.82), F(1, 57) = .023, p = .88, ηp 2 = .000. This indicates 
that ostracism did not affect risk-taking behavior collapsing across versions of the CCT. Risk-
taking behavior did not significantly differ for participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition 
(M = 12.24, SD = 4.51) and those that received no instructions (M = 13.83, SD = 5.76), F(1, 57) 
= 1.20, p = .28, ηp 2 = .023. This indicates that cognitive reappraisal instructions did not change 
risk-taking behavior. Lastly, I expected that cognitive reappraisal would reduce the effects of 
ostracism for each version of the CCT. Contrary to this prediction, there was a statistically non-
significant three-way (Social condition x ER instructions x CCT version) interaction F(1, 57) = 
0.35, p = .56, ηp 2 = .006, which shows that participants in the cognitive reappraisal condition did 
not uniquely vary based on social condition or CCT version excluding trials when a loss card 
was chosen.  
Exploratory Analyses 
A four-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to better understand how 
participants used information for gain amount, loss amount, and number of loss cards on each 
version of the CCT for risk-taking. A 2 (loss amount: 250 vs. 750) x 2 (gain amount: 10 vs. 30) x 
2 (number of loss cards: 1 vs. 3) x 2 (CCT version: Hot vs. Cold) mixed factorial ANOVA was 
conducted for number of cards selected. Table 5 provides marginal means and standard 
deviations for risk-taking for loss amount, gain amount, number of loss cards, and CCT version.  
As noted above, participants chose more cards on average in the Cold CCT (M = 13.61, 
SD = 9.09) than participants on the Hot CCT (M = 9.79, SD = 7.20), F(1, 63) = 23.58, p < .001, 
ηp 2 = .272. Additionally, participants chose more cards overall when there was one loss card (M 
= 13.49, SD = 8.68) than when there were three loss cards (M = 9.85, SD = 7.71), F(1, 63) = 
69.52, p < .001, ηp 2 = .525. These main effects were qualified by a statistically significant two-
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way interaction between number of loss cards and CCT version F(1, 63) = 28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 = 
.314. Specifically, there was a greater difference between one loss card trials (M = 12.75, SD= 
6.82) and three loss card trials (M = 6.82, SD = 4.84) in the Hot CCT condition (p < .001) than 
between one loss card trials (M = 14.26, SD = .9.34) and three loss card trials (M = 12.97, SD = 
8.81) in the Cold CCT condition (p = 0.41). This indicates that participants noticed that the 
number of loss cards were changing and used that information when determining how many 
cards to choose on the CCT, especially in the Hot CCT version. Table 6 provides marginal 
means and standard deviations for risk-taking for number of loss cards and CCT version. 
Although participants chose a greater number of cards overall on the Cold CCT than on the Hot 
CCT, the effect of number of loss cards was greater for the Hot CCT on risk-taking as can be 
seen in Figure 3. 
There was a non-significant main effect for loss amount F(1, 63) = .06, p = .80, ηp 2 = 
.001 such that participants did not differ on the number of cards selected when the loss amount 
was 250 (M =11.71, SD =8.52) or 750 (M =11.63, SD = 8.30). This indicates that loss amount 
did not strongly affect participants’ risk-taking for either version of the CCT. There was also a 
non-significant main effect for gain amount F(1, 63) = .01, p = .923, ηp 2 = .000 such that 
participants did not differ on the number of cards selected for a gain of 10 (M = 11.65, SD = 
8.52) or a gain of 30 (M = 11.69, SD = 8.30). This indicates that gain amount did not strongly 
influence participants’ decisions for how many cards to select in either CCT version. 
There was, however, a statistically significant interaction between loss amount and gain 
amount F(1, 63) = 4.47, p = .039, ηp 2 = .066. Specifically, participants chose more cards when 
the loss was 250 points and there was a win of 30 points (M = 12.04, SD = 8.38) than when there 
was a loss of 250 points and a win of 10 points (M = 11.38, SD = 8.65), and conversely, 
40 
 
participants chose more cards when there was a loss of 750 points with a gain of 10 points (M = 
11.92, SD = 11.34) than when there was a loss of 750 points and a gain of 30 points (M = 11.34, 
SD = 8.21), though pairwise comparisons indicated neither of these differences were statistically 
significant (ps ≥ .19). However, given the similarity in all of these mean scores for risk-taking 
and the number of interactions tested in the four-way ANOVA, this two-way interaction may 
have occurred by chance and is likely not informative for understanding how participants used 
gain and loss amount on the CCT. All additional interactions were statistically non-significant, 
all F(1, 63) ≤ 2.00, all p ≥ .16. Given that participants’ risk-taking behavior did not differ as a 
function of gain amount, loss amount, and number of loss cards for the Cold CCT, as shown in 
Figure 4, and that participants chose more cards on average in the Cold CCT than the Hot CCT, 
it is likely that the Cold CCT in the current study was not reflective of a deliberative risk-taking 
task. Instead, it is likely that participants randomly chose numbers for the Cold CCT without 
regard to the different combinations for loss amount, gain amount, and number of loss cards. For 
the Hot CCT, it is clear that participants primarily used number of loss cards when selecting the 





























Note. Participants’ self-reported anger, measured on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very much 
so), was significantly higher in the ostracism condition than in the social inclusion condition. 























M SD N 
Social 
Inclusion 
Control 2.47 1.940 17 
Reappraisal 2.47 2.601 17 
Total 2.47* 2.259 34 
Ostracism 
Control 4.13 2.680 16 
Reappraisal 4.13 2.446 15 
Total 4.13* 2.526 31 
Total 
Control 3.27 2.440 33 
Reappraisal 3.25 2.627 32 




The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by Social Condition, Emotion-Regulation 




























Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected (0-32 cards for each round) for each of the 
eight conditions.  
















Control 14.30 2.64 9 
Reappraisal 14.17 2.81 8 
Total 14.24 2.64 17 
Ostracism 
Control 13.66 5.06 8 
Reappraisal 12.05 5.23 7 
Total 12.91 5.02 15 
Total 
Control 14.00 3.85 17 
Reappraisal 13.18 4.11 15 




Control 10.44 2.79 8 
Reappraisal 9.54 1.99 9 
Total 9.96 2.37 17 
Ostracism 
Control 9.83 2.09 8 
Reappraisal 9.36 2.27 8 
Total 9.60 2.12 16 
Total 
Control 10.14 2.40 16 
Reappraisal 9.45 2.06 17 




Control 12.48 3.29 17 
Reappraisal 11.72 3.33 17 
Total 12.10 3.28 34 
Ostracism 
Control 11.75 4.23 16 
Reappraisal 10.61 4.03 15 
Total 11.20 4.11 31 
Total 
Control 12.13 3.73 33 
Reappraisal 11.20 3.66 32 





The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by Social Condition, Emotion-Regulation 


















Note. All comparisons were non-significant, p > .05. This represents 25% of the trials as 

















Control 14.30 2.64 9 
Reappraisal 14.17 2.81 8 
Total 14.24 2.64 17 
Ostracism 
Control 13.66 5.06 8 
Reappraisal 12.05 5.23 7 
Total 12.91 5.02 15 
Total 
Control 14.00 3.85 17 
Reappraisal 13.18 4.11 15 




Control 13.45 8.03 5 
Reappraisal 10.53 4.76 8 
Total 11.65 6.07 13 
Ostracism 
Control 13.70 8.48 7 
Reappraisal 12.18 5.11 7 
Total 12.94 6.78 14 
Total 
Control 13.59 7.92 12 
Reappraisal 11.30 4.82 15 




Control 14.00 4.93 14 
Reappraisal 12.35 4.22 16 
Total 13.12 4.56 30 
Ostracism 
Control 13.68 6.61 15 
Reappraisal 12.11 4.97 14 
Total 12.92 5.82 29 
Total 
Control 13.83 5.76 29 
Reappraisal 12.24 4.51 30 





The Means and Standard Deviations of Risk-taking by CCT version, Loss amount, Gain Amount, 















Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected for the parameters of the Hot and Cold CCT.  













Gain Amount  
Number of 





1 14.25 10.00 
3 12.26 9.02 
30 
1 15.30 9.15 
3 13.15 8.80 
750 
10 
1 13.95 9.52 
3 13.69 8.99 
30 
1 13.53 8.68 
3 12.79 8.50 




1 12.71 8.27 
3 6.41 4.19 
30 
1 12.54 8.15 




1 12.97 7.27 
3 7.19 5.39 
30 
1 12.80 8.08 
3 6.34 5.01 





The Means and Standard Deviation of Risk-taking by CCT version (Cold vs. Hot) and Number of 











Note. Participants’ mean number of cards selected collapsing across CCT version and the 
number of loss cards. There was a main effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a 
statistically significant two-way interaction between loss cards and CCT version, F(1, 63) = 
28.81, p < .001, ηp 2 = .314. 


















1 LC 14.26*** 9.34 
3 LC 12.97*** 8.81 
Total 13.61*** 9.09 
Hot CCT 
1 LC 12.75* 6.82 
3 LC 6.82* 4.84 
Total 9.79*** 7.20 
Total 
1 LC 13.49 8.68 
3 LC 9.85 7.71 




Figure 1. A visual representation of the mean and standard errors for social condition and 
emotion-regulation condition on self-reported anger. Participants in the ostracism condition self-
reported greater feelings of anger than those in the social inclusion condition, F(1, 61) = 7.55, p 
= .008, ηp 2 = .110  Self-reported anger did not differ across instruction conditions within social 




Figure 2. A visual representation of the means and standard errors for social condition, 
emotion-regulation condition, and CCT version on risk-taking. The predicted three-way 












Figure 3. A visual representation of participants’ mean number of cards selected and 
standard errors collapsing across CCT version and the number of loss cards. There was a 
main effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a statistically significant two-way 














Figure 4. Participants’ mean number of cards selected (0-32 cards for each round) and 
standard errors for each of the parameters of the Hot and Cold CCT. There was a main 
effect for CCT version, which was qualified by a two-way interaction between loss cards 











The purpose of the current study was to explore the effects of ostracism and emotion-
regulation on risk-taking behavior. To my knowledge this study was the first conducted to 
examine the effects of ostracism-related anger using the Columbia Card Task. Supporting my 
prediction, ostracized participants self-reported greater feelings of anger, but not general 
negative affect, compared to participants who were socially included during Cyberball. Contrary 
to my prediction, no three-way interaction was found between social condition (ostracism vs. 
inclusion), emotion-regulation condition (reappraisal vs. no instructions), and CCT version (Hot 
vs. Cold) on risk-taking. There was no main effect of social condition or emotion-regulation 
instructions on number of cards selected. There was an effect of CCT version but it was in the 
opposite direction as predicted.  
Ostracism 
 It appears that the manipulation of ostracism was effective in the current study as 
ostracized participants significantly differed in self-reported feelings of being excluded, ignored, 
and estimated number of throws received than included participants did. I decided to limit throws 
to only 30 ball tosses because Hartgerink et al. (2015) found this to be the most common number 
of throws to manipulate ostracism and that increasing number of throws between the players 
decreased the effects of ostracism. Additionally, Buelow, Okdie, and Trost (2015) report that the 
distortive cognitive effects of ostracism can persist 45 minutes following a manipulation of 
ostracism. Falk et al. (2014) found that ostracism continued to affect risk-taking behavior in the 
lab one week after being ostracized during Cyberball. Given that the experiment was only 15-20 
minutes and that the ostracism manipulation check questions occurred following the CCT, it is 
51 
 
likely that Cyberball effectively induced feelings of ostracism in the current study, and those 
feelings persisted to the end of the experiment. Furthermore, participants in the ostracism 
condition commonly expressed frustration about the Cyberball task in an informal discussion 
after the experimental tasks were concluded and prior to debriefing. The manipulation of 
ostracism appears to have been effective; however, it is possible the effects of ostracism on risk-
taking were not observed in the current study because there was not enough statistical power to 
observe small differences between the social conditions. 
Anger 
 It also appears that ostracism relative to social inclusion specifically increased feelings of 
anger, replicating the finding of Svetiva et al. (2016). Participants who were ostracized reported 
feeling significantly angrier than included participants. However, regardless of social condition,  
self-reported anger among participants was relatively low considering a 9-point scale was 
utilized. Of the 65 participants, 44 participants (67.7%) selected 4 or less for anger on the Likert-
type scale. The differences between anger for social conditions were also not as large as reported 
by Zadro, Williams, and Richardson (2003); however, this may be because of the ambiguity 
regarding whether or not the players were real people or computer simulated in the current study. 
Given that there was no statistical difference between social condition and emotion-regulation 
for anger, anger may not have been strong enough to be reduced by cognitive reappraisal 
instructions. According to the interactive influence model of emotion and cognition, Luo and Yu 
(2015) suggest that emotions impact decision-making processes when emotions are particularly 
strong or when cognitive resources are weakened. Anger-induced ostracism may not have been 
strong enough to affect risk-taking on the CCT. Additionally, other negative emotions such as 
sadness (not measured in the current study) may reduce risk-taking behavior (Yuen & Lee, 
52 
 
2003).Thus, it is possible that ostracism may have also increased feelings of sadness, which 
counteracted or obscured the effects of anger on risk-taking in the current study. Given that anger 
increased following ostracism, future studies should continue to isolate the specific effects of 
anger instead of or in addition to general negative affect. 
Negative Affect 
 There was no statistical difference of social condition and emotion-regulation instructions 
on general negative affect. The findings of the current study support the suggestion of Svetieva et 
al. (2016) that the effects of ostracism on specific negative emotions such as anger may be 
obscured by only measuring negative affect. One could argue that because the PANAS 
instructions asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt each emotion following the 
CCT task that self-reported affect may not represent emotions felt during Cyberball. These 
instructions were utilized because it was believed that participants would be unable to 
retrospectively report their feelings during the Cyberball game and that negative affect from 
Cyberball would persist throughout the experiment.  Additionally, if the effects of ostracism on 
negative affect are so weak that they do not persist several minutes, these effects are likely not 
meaningful enough to inform decision-making.   
Reappraisal 
 Cognitive reappraisal scores were calculated for participants in both the cognitive 
reappraisal condition and the no emotion-regulation condition. It was predicted that participants 
in the reappraisal condition would be higher on reappraisal than those in the no instruction 
condition. Supporting the prediction, participants in the reappraisal condition did score higher on 
the reappraisal measure than those given no instructions. However, these findings should be 
interpreted with caution given the low Cronbach’s alpha observed in the current study, especially 
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for participants in the Reappraisal condition. There also may have been demand characteristics 
for participants in the reappraisal condition on the first reappraisal item: “I tried to see the task as 
objectively as possible.” In the cognitive reappraisal instructions, participants are asked to view 
the task “objectively,” which may have cued participants in the reappraisal condition to the 
manipulation, and resulted in them scoring higher on the reappraisal measure. Additionally, 
some participants may habitually and automatically reappraise a stressful situation without being 
given instruction to do so (Panno et al., 2013), which would have reduced observed differences 
in reappraisal scores. Although the manipulation check of reappraisal partially supports the 
effectiveness of the cognitive reappraisal instructions, it cannot be concluded with certainty that 
participants in the reappraisal condition utilized the instructions during the Cyberball task. If 
participants did not utilize these instructions, this may explain why there was no effect of 
emotion-regulation condition on anger and negative affect scores. Alternatively, these 
instructions may not have been sufficient enough to alter negative emotions following ostracism.  
Ostracism and Risk-taking on the CCT 
Although we found support that ostracism via Cyberball increases feelings of anger, these 
findings diverge from previous findings reported in the literature for risk-taking. For instance, I 
was unable to replicate the effects of ostracism for increasing risk-taking (Buelow and Wirth, 
2017; Svetieva et al., 2016). However, the type of risk-taking task in the study differed from 
previously utilized risk-taking measures. Thus, it could be something about decision-making on 
the Columbia Card Task which may cause ostracism-related anger to have a unique or a limited 
effect for risk-taking compared to other risk-taking measures. 
Additionally, though there was a main-effect of CCT version, this should be interpreted 
with caution as participants’ risk-taking behavior was in the opposite direction as previously 
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found for the Hot and Cold CCT versions. Specifically, participants in a neutral state have been 
shown to be riskier on the Hot CCT version, selecting more cards on average, compared to the 
Cold CCT version (Figner et al., 2009). In contrast, I found that participants selected more cards 
on average in the Cold CCT than in the Hot CCT version. In the exploratory analysis, it became 
clear that participants were not considering gain amount, loss amount, or number of loss cards on 
the Cold CCT in the current study. During the debriefing process, many participants verbally 
indicated that they were confused regarding the instructions for the Cold CCT version, chose 
randomly, chose their favorite number, or tried to detect a pattern that did not exist. Thus, it is 
unclear if participants properly understood the directions for the Cold CCT version, if 
participants responded randomly, or if they understood the instructions but were not motivated to 
use the information provided about the loss amount, gain amount, and number of loss cards. A 
poor understanding of the Cold CCT may have reduced interest level in the task, increasing 
random responding, and may have produced what appears like greater risk-taking on the Cold 
CCT than the Hot CCT.  
Furthermore, nearly half of the participants selected 32 cards in the Cold CCT on at least 
one of the 24 trials, which could be considered a guaranteed loss even if there is only one loss 
card present. However, for some combinations, participants may have interpreted the task in a 
way that it would be advantageous to select all 32 cards for some combinations (e.g., 30 win 
amount, 750 loss amount, 1 loss card = potential net gain of 180 points; 30 win amount, 750 loss 
amount, 3 loss cards = net gain of 120 points; 10 win amount, 250 loss amount, 1 loss card = net 
gain of 60 points). Thus, the ambiguity of the CCT instructions, though modified from previous 
CCT versions, is a limitation of the current study. It is unclear if participants selected 32 cards 
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for the Cold CCT because they were carelessly responding, did not understand the task, or 
interpreted it as advantageous to do so.  
Although efforts were made to remove careless responders, it appears that the Cold 
version of the CCT was not an effective measure of risk-taking behavior. I suspect that the Hot 
CCT, which is more interactive and easier to understand after several rounds, provided a better 
measure of decision-making strategies participants used than the Cold CCT. Examining the 
reliability of the Hot CCT task revealed that participants’ consistency on the Hot task was 
somewhat low (Cronbach’s α = .663). Variability in responses as a function of the task parameter 
values (e.g., the number of specified loss cards) is one possible contributor to this modest 
reliability. The random placement of loss cards might have also decreased task reliability. More 
specifically, when participants selected one of the randomly placed loss cards it immediately 
terminated that round of the task, and selecting a loss card by chance in one of their first several 
choices may have produced a deviation from their normal pattern of response and artificially 
decreased reliability. It is also possible that participants in the current study were not as 
motivated as would be hoped. To increase participant understanding and decrease careless 
responders, previous studies have incorporated CCT comprehension questions and practice 
rounds and paid participants based on the performance of a random round on the CCT; however, 
this was not possible in the current study due to time and financial constraints. Given these 
issues, future research must further explore the reliability of the task when evaluating risk-taking 
behavior.  
When examining the four-way ANOVA in regards to loss amount, win amount, number 
of loss cards, and CCT version, participants’ risk-taking did not change based on the eight 
different combinations. Given that the Cold CCT does not appear to be a good measure of risk-
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taking in the current study, it is not feasible to make comparisons between the effects of anger or 
ostracism between the two CCT versions. Thus, we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the 
potential divergent effects of anger for the hot and cold CCT versions, suggested by Baumann 
and DeSteno (2012) and based on the Conceptual Act Model. Additionally, participants in the 
current study may have been riskier than other samples given that most participants persisted on 
the Hot CCT until a loss card was hit for 75% of the trials and six participants hit a loss card on 
all 24 rounds.  
Strengths and Limitations 
There are several strengths and limitations to the current study. One strength of the study 
was that participants completed the entire study on the computer, which assigned participants to 
one of eight conditions unknown to the research assistant. This double-blind design minimizes 
the potential for experimenter bias on risk-taking. It is also important that distractions were 
minimized by completing the study in the lab, which is especially important for the manipulation 
of ostracism. Steps were also taken to maximize participant focus such as providing audio 
recordings for long instruction pages, having participants wear headphones, ensuring that the 
program slides did not advance until the audio was finished for the instruction pages, and 
limiting the experiment to 15-30 minutes to complete.  
Despite the strengths of the current study, there were still several limitations. First, the 
sample size for the study was small, limiting statistical power. Thus, the sample size may have 
simply not been large enough to see an effect of ostracism on risk-taking. Given the questionable 
efficacy of the Cold CCT in the current study, data on risk-taking for the Cold CCT may have 
obscured possible effects. Finally, it seems likely that participants’ decisions were not affected 
by the awareness of the ostracism manipulation due to the subtlety of the Cyberball task. A 
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previous study reported that participants self-reported feelings of anger when ostracized by a 
computer (Zadro, Williams, & Richardson, 2004); however, that 88% of participants in the 
present study believed that the other players in the Cyberball game were computer generated 
may have reduced the effects of ostracism on risk-taking.  
Overall Conclusions 
The first aim of this study was to extend previous findings of ostracism and risk-taking to 
affective and non-affective deliberative decision-making. Becasuse we likely did not obtain the 
necessary sample size to observe an effect of ostracism on risk-taking and the Cold CCT (non-
affective measure) appears to be a poor risk-taking measure in the current study, we cannot draw 
conclusions about the effects of ostracism on affective and non-affective deliberative decision-
making. Ostracism via Cyberball may not be sufficient enough to affect risk-taking on the CCT 
or there could be an aspect of the CCT that is obscuring the results. In regards to the second aim 
of the study, I replicated the effects of ostracism for increasing anger reported by Svetieva et al. 
(2016). However, this study could not detemine if ostracism-induced anger had differential 
effects on the Hot and Cold CCT because of the poor efficacy of the Cold CCT measure. Lastly, 
it still remains uncertain if emotion-regulation instructions are sufficient to moderate the effects 
of ostracism on risk-taking. The effectiveness and extent that the cognitive reappraisal 
instructions were utilized in the current study remains uncertain. Lastly, the effects of emotion-
regulation on ostracism and risk-taking could not be evaluated as ostracism did not affect risk-
taking.  
In all consideration, it is possible that ostracism via Cyberball does not affect risk-taking 
behavior on the Columbia Card Task. However, before any conclusions can be made it is 
important to further test the effects of ostracism and anger on the CCT and other risk-taking 
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measures. It may be that a different paradigm for ostracism or a variation to the Cyberball task 
(e.g., number of ball throws and deceptively informing participants that the other players in 
Cyberball are real, utilizing an alternative ostracism manipulation such as Atimia) may 
differentially affect risk-taking. Additionally, it is important to explore these effects in a 
community sample with participants of different ages and backgrounds to increase external 
validity of the findings.  
Future research should seek to replicate the divergent effects of anger on the Hot and 
Cold versions of the CCT as found by Baumann and DeSteno (2012). Anger differs from other 
negative emotions as it is associated with appraisals of high certainty and control (Learner & 
Keltner, 2000); however, inducing anger in the lab may be challenging. It is important to 
determine that anger does differentially affect risk-taking for the CCT versions as only one study 
has examined and reported this effect. If anger increases risk-taking on the Hot and Cold CCT 
rather than having divergent effects on risk-taking, this would provide stronger support for the 
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) than the Conceptual Act Model.  
Additionally, alternative manipulations of ostracism should be utilized. Participants are 
often samples of convinence, coming from psychology classes and thus may be familiar with 
Cyberball. No participants verbally reported knowledge of the Cyberball task during the 
debriefing process, but it is important that all studies in a particular area do not rest upon a single 
paradigm. Futhermore, researchers should investigate the effects of different emotion-regulation 
strategies and instructions on decision-making. Although Richards and Gross (2000) characterize 
reappraisal as an antecedent-focused emotion-regulation strategy, it is also commonly utilized 
following a full emotional reponse, and it is unknown if reappraisal is utilized after an emotional 
response develops how that impacts its overall effectiveness. Future research could induce 
59 
 
emotional responses, vary when and what emotion-regulation instructions are given, and 
measure risk-taking behavior.  
It is important to determine the extent to which ostracism affects risk-taking, especially 
for adolescents and young adults who may be especially sensitive to ostracism. It could be that 
ostracism affects risk-taking more in situations of uncertainty (e.g., driving) rather than objective 
risk (e.g., some gambling tasks such as Blackjack) or more in the presence of others than when 
alone. The type of risk-taking task used in the lab may affect what type of processing participants 
predominantly rely on. For instance, participants may rely primarily on Type I processing 
(automatic, gut-level) processing for risk-taking tasks under uncertainty (e.g., BART) and Type 
II processing (careful, deliberative) for situations in which probabiblity of a win or loss can be 
deterimined (e.g., Game of Dice task, CCT). However, we often utilize a combination of Type I 
and Type II processes when making a decision, and it is necessary to further explore the extent 
that ostracism and emotions affect Type I and Type II processes and the many facets of risk-
taking. If one domain (e.g., driving) is principally affected by risk-taking, then interventions can 
be created and implemented to target risk-taking in that area for specific populations.  
Given the negative consequences of ostracism and the ubiquity of ostracism and risk-
taking, it is important to better understand the relationship between ostracism and risk-taking. In 
fact, it may be especially important to explore this relationship among adolescents and young 
adults, who experience novel opportunities for risky behavior (e.g., driving behavior, sexual 
decisions, financial decisions) and may be particularly sensitive to ostracism. The present study 
revealed that there potentially are relations between ostracism and the emotions we experience, 
and previous research suggests that these emotions might affect the way we make decisions. 
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Additional research is necessary to identify the ways in which ostracism, specific emotions, and 

























Angie, A. D., Connelly, S., Waples, E. P., & Kligyte, V. (2011). The influence of discrete 
emotions on judgement and decision-making: A meta-analytic review. Cognition & 
Emotion, 25(8), 1393-1422. 
Baumann, J., & DeSteno, D. (2012). Context explains divergent effects of anger on risk 
taking. Emotion, 12(6), 1196. 
Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal 
attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117(3), 497. 
Baumeister, R. F., Brewer, L. E., Tice, D. M., & Twenge, J. M. (2007). Thwarting the need to 
belong: Understanding the interpersonal and inner effects of social exclusion. Social and 
Personality Psychology Compass, 1(1), 506-520. 
Baumeister, R. F., Twenge, J. M., & Nuss, C. K. (2002). Effects of social exclusion on cognitive 
processes: Anticipated aloneness reduces intelligent thought. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 83(4), 817. 
Beltz, B. (2018). Safer America Consumer Safety Information: 100+ Car Accident Statistics for 
2019. Retrieved from https://safer-america.com/car-accident-statistics/#US 
Bernstein, M. J., & Claypool, H. M. (2012a). Not all social exclusions are created equal: 
Emotional distress following social exclusion is moderated by exclusion paradigm. Social 
Influence, 7(2), 113-130. 
Bernstein, M. J., & Claypool, H. M. (2012b). Social exclusion and pain sensitivity: Why 
exclusion sometimes hurts and sometimes numbs. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 38(2), 185-196. 
62 
 
Blackhart, G. C., Nelson, B. C., Knowles, M. L., & Baumeister, R. F. (2009). Rejection elicits 
emotional reactions but neither causes immediate distress nor lowers self-esteem: A 
meta-analytic review of 192 studies on social exclusion. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review, 13(4), 269-309. 
Blakemore, S. J., & Mills, K. L. (2014). Is adolescence a sensitive period for sociocultural 
processing? Annual Review of Psychology, 65, 187-207. 
Boyer, T. W. (2006). The development of risk-taking: A multi-perspective review. 
Developmental Review, 26(3), 291-345.  
Buelow, M. T., & Wirth, J. H. (2017). Decisions in the face of known risks: Ostracism increases 
risky decision-making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 69, 210-217. 
Buelow, M. T., Okdie, B. M., Brunell, A. B., & Trost, Z. (2015). Stuck in a moment and you 
cannot get out of it: The lingering effects of ostracism on cognition and satisfaction of 
basic needs. Personality and Individual Differences, 76, 39-43. 
Crawford, J. R., & Henry, J. D. (2004). The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS): 
Construct validity, measurement properties and normative data in a large non‐clinical 
sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(3), 245-265. 
Deri, S., & Zitek, E. M. (2017). Did you reject me for someone else? Rejections that are   
comparative feel worse. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 43(12), 1675-1685. 
DeWall, C. N., Twenge, J. M., Koole, S. L., Baumeister, R. F., Marquez, A., & Reid, M. W. 
(2011). Automatic emotion-regulation after social exclusion: Tuning to 
positivity. Emotion, 11(3), 623. 
Duclos, R., Wan, E. W., & Jiang, Y. (2012). Show me the honey! Effects of social exclusion on 
financial risk-taking. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(1), 122-135. 
63 
 
Egloff, B., Schmukle, S. C., Burns, L. R., & Schwerdtfeger, A. (2006). Spontaneous emotion-
regulation during evaluated speaking tasks: Associations with negative affect, anxiety 
expression, memory, and physiological responding. Emotion, 6(3), 356. 
Falk, E. B., Cascio, C. N., O'Donnell, M. B., Carp, J., Tinney, F. J., Bingham, C. R., & Simons-
Morton, B. G. (2014). Neural responses to exclusion predict susceptibility to social 
influence. Journal of Adolescent Health, 54(5), S22-S31. 
Figner, B., Mackinlay, R. J., Wilkening, F., & Weber, E. U. (2009). Affective and deliberative 
processes in risky choice: Age differences in risk taking in the Columbia Card Task. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(3), 709. 
Forgas, J. P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM). Psychological 
Bulletin, 117(1), 39. 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2004). The broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 359(1449), 1367. 
Gerber, J., & Wheeler, L. (2009). On being rejected: A meta-analysis of experimental research 
on rejection. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4(5), 468-488. 
Goodman, K. L., & Southam-Gerow, M. A. (2010). The regulating role of negative emotions in 
children’s coping with peer rejection. Child Psychiatry & Human Development, 41(5), 
515-534. 
Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion-regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social consequences. 
Psychophysiology, 39(3), 281-291. 
Gross, J. J. (2002). Emotion-regulation: Affective, cognitive, and social 
consequences. Psychophysiology, 39(3), 281-291. 
64 
 
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion-regulation processes: 
Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(2), 348. 
Hartgerink, C. H., Van Beest, I., Wicherts, J. M., & Williams, K. D. (2015). The ordinal effects 
of ostracism: A meta-analysis of 120 Cyberball studies. PloS one, 10(5), e0127002. 
Hawes, D. J., Zadro, L., Fink, E., Richardson, R., O'Moore, K., Griffiths, B., Dadds, M., & 
Williams, K. D. (2012). The effects of peer ostracism on children's cognitive 
processes. European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9(5), 599-613. 
Heilman, R. M., Crişan, L. G., Houser, D., Miclea, M., & Miu, A. C. (2010). Emotion-regulation 
and decision making under risk and uncertainty. Emotion, 10(2), 257. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan. 
Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific 
influences on judgement and choice. Cognition & Emotion, 14(4), 473-493. 
Li, Z., Sang, Z., & Zhang, Z. (2015). Expressive suppression and financial risk taking: A 
mediated moderation model. Personality and Individual Differences, 72, 35-40. 
Luo, J., & Yu, R. (2015). Follow the heart or the head? The interactive influence model of 
emotion and cognition. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 573. 
Masten, C. L., Eisenberger, N. I., Borofsky, L. A., Pfeifer, J. H., McNealy, K., Mazziotta, J. C., 
& Dapretto, M. (2009). Neural correlates of social exclusion during adolescence: 
Understanding the distress of peer rejection. Social Cognitive and Affective 
Neuroscience, 4(2), 143-157. 
McDonald, M. M., & Donnellan, M. B. (2012). Is ostracism a strong situation? The influence of 
personality in reactions to rejection. Journal of Research in Personality, 46(5), 614-618. 
65 
 
Panno, A., Lauriola, M., & Figner, B. (2013). Emotion-regulation and risk taking: Predicting 
risky choice in deliberative decision making. Cognition & Emotion, 27(2), 326-334. 
Peake, S. J., Dishion, T. J., Stormshak, E. A., Moore, W. E., & Pfeifer, J. H. (2013). Risk-taking 
and social exclusion in adolescence: Neural mechanisms underlying peer influences on 
decision-making. NeuroImage, 82, 23-34. 
Ren, D., Wesselmann, E., & Williams, K. D. (2016). Evidence for another response to ostracism: 
Solitude seeking. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7(3), 204-212. 
Richards, J. M., & Gross, J. J. (2000). Emotion-regulation and memory: The cognitive costs of 
keeping one's cool. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(3), 410. 
Riva, P., Montali, L., Wirth, J. H., Curioni, S., & Williams, K. D. (2017). Chronic social 
exclusion and evidence for the resignation stage: An empirical investigation. Journal of 
Social and Personal Relationships, 34(4), 541-564. 
Schiebener, J., & Brand, M. (2015). Decision making under objective risk conditions–a review 
of cognitive and emotional correlates, strategies, feedback processing, and external 
influences. Neuropsychology Review, 25(2), 171-198. 
Silvers, J. A., McRae, K., Gabrieli, J. D., Gross, J. J., Remy, K. A., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). 
Age-related differences in emotional reactivity, regulation, and rejection sensitivity in 
adolescence. Emotion, 12(6), 1235. 
Somerville, L. H., Haddara, N., Sasse, S. F., Skwara, A. C., Moran, J. M., & Figner, B. (2018). 
Dissecting “Peer Presence” and “Decisions” to deepen understanding of peer influence 
on adolescent risky choice. Child Development. Advance online publication. 
66 
 
Srivastav, A. (2017). Emotion-regulation strategies in response to ostracism: Effects on mood 
and eating behavior in individuals with and without binge eating (Doctoral dissertation, 
Ohio University). 
Svetieva, E., Zadro, L., Denson, T. F., Dale, E., O’Moore, K., & Zheng, W. Y. (2016). Anger 
mediates the effect of ostracism on risk-taking. Journal of Risk Research, 19(5), 614-631. 
Szasz, P. L., Hofmann, S. G., Heilman, R. M., & Curtiss, J. (2016). Effect of regulating anger 
and sadness on decision-making. Cognitive Behavior Therapy, 45(6), 479-495. 
Twenge, J. M., Catanese, K. R., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Social exclusion and the 
deconstructed state: Time perception, meaninglessness, lethargy, lack of emotion, and 
self-awareness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(3), 409. 
Van Beest, I., & Williams, K. D. (2006). When inclusion costs and ostracism pays, ostracism 
still hurts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(5), 918. 
Wesselmann, E. D., & Williams, K. D. (2017). Social life and social death: Inclusion, ostracism, 
and rejection in groups. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 20(5), 693-706. 
Williams, K. D. (2009). Ostracism: A temporal need‐threat model. Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 41, 275-314. 
Williams, K. D., & Jarvis, B. (2006). Cyberball: A program for use in research on interpersonal 
ostracism and acceptance. Behavior Research Methods, 38(1), 174-180. 
Williams, K. D., Cheung, C. K., & Choi, W. (2000). Cyberostracism: Effects of being ignored 
over the Internet. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(5), 748. 
Wirth, J. H., Turchan, P. J., Zimmerman, A. G., & Bernstein, M. J. (2014). Atimia: A novel 
group-based paradigm for manipulating ostracism and group members’ 
performance. Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 18(3), 251. 
67 
 
Yuen, K. S., & Lee, T. M. (2003). Could mood state affect risk-taking decisions?. Journal of 
Affective Disorders, 75(1), 11-18. 
Zadro, L., Williams, K. D., & Richardson, R. (2004). How low can you go? Ostracism by a 
computer is sufficient to lower self-reported levels of belonging, control, self-esteem, and 


































HOT COLUMBIA CARD TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
You are now going to participate in a card game. In this game, you will turn over cards to win or lose points.  
 
In each game round, you will see cards laid out on the computer screen, face down. You will decide how many of 
these cards to turn over. Each card is either a gain card or a loss card. You will know how many gain cards and loss 
cards there are, and how many points you will gain or lose if you turn over a gain or loss card. What you don't know 
is which cards are gain cards and which are loss cards. 
[Hot CCT Instructions] To flip a card, click it with the mouse.  Every time you flip a gain card by you get the 
points added to your round total and you have the chance to turn over another card. The first time you turn over a 
loss card, the loss points are subtracted from your current point total and the round immediately ends. You can 
decide to stop turning over cards at any point, as long as you have not yet turned over a loss card. 













COLD COLUMBIA CARD TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
You are now going to participate in a card game. In this game, you will turn over cards to win or lose points.  
 
In each game round, you will see cards laid out on the computer screen, face down. You will decide how many of 
these cards to turn over. Each card is either a gain card or a loss card. You will know how many gain cards and loss 
cards there are, and how many points you will gain or lose if you turn over a gain or loss card. What you don't know 
is which cards are gain cards and which are loss cards. 
[Cold CCT Instructions] You will indicate the number of cards (from 0 to 32) you want to turn over by clicking on 
a small number button. You should make this choice as if that number of cards would then be randomly chosen to be 
turned over, one at a time, until a loss card is flipped or the number of cards you chose is reached.   
You will play a total of 24 rounds. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
